

PLEASURE: 360-300 B.C.

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STOIC AND EPICUREAN theories and attitudes about pleasure vary considerably; all, however, are a product of the renewed debates of the second half of the fourth century, of which our first documentary evidence is presumably Plato's *Philebus*. A glance at the history of the debate will not only shed light on why Epicurus and Zeno said what they said—and much of this ground is well-trodden—but it may help us to get to grips with a small part of the complicated problem of the development of the thought of Aristotle. This area has often been tackled partially: some have looked at the relation between Aristotle's theories of pleasure and those of Plato; other scholars have considered the impact of Aristotle on Epicurus,¹ and, less frequently, on the Stoics.² Rarely has the attempt been made to co-ordinate these inquiries, though the arguments of the late fourth century about pleasure afford us the opportunity to make such a co-ordination. We shall approach our topic primarily through descriptions and definitions (or what look like definitions) of pleasure.

The first adherent of pleasure in the *Philebus* is Philebus himself, but his defence apparently does not rise to the level of philosophy. He may represent the "ordinary" man,³ or perhaps the views of Aristippus. But when we get to the argument between Socrates and Protarchus, something that looks like an attempted definition appears: the restoration of an organ "to its own nature," apparently to its own proper and natural condition (*εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν*, 42d 5), is pleasure (or *a* pleasure). This natural condition is described by Socrates as an attunement (of what is not clear, 31d 4). When this attunement undergoes disruption (*λυομένης*), we simultaneously feel "pain"—Socrates says that there is a coming-to-be (*γένεσις*) of pain. The two passages seem to offer slightly different descriptions of pleasure and pain, and presumably Plato has not distinguished these descriptions (or at least has not recognized any distinction as important). In 31d it looks as though pleasure and pain are generated as processes at the same time as the processes of replenishment or emptying—the composition or disruption of harmony—in the organism, but even

¹E.g., E. Bignone, *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro* (Florence 1936); C. Diano, "La psicologia d'Epicuro e la teoria delle passioni," *GCFI* 20 (1939) 105-145; 21 (1940) 151-165; 22 (1941) 5-34; 23 (1942) 5-49, 121-150.

²E.g., A. A. Long, "Aristotle's Legacy to Stoic Ethics," *BICS* 15 (1968) 72-85; R. P. Haynes, "The Theory of Pleasure of the Old Stoa," *AJP* 83 (1962) 412-419.

³As suggested at 66e.

in the next section (31e–32a) Socrates appears to be saying that the actual movement of the bodily components *is* itself pleasure or pain (ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ὁδός) or *a* pleasure or pain. Thus it seems to be implied that it makes no difference whether we say that pleasure (or some pleasure) which is itself a process, is identical with the process of replenishment, or whether it accompanies replenishment.⁴ But the question of whether this indicates a confusion in Plato's thinking should be appraised cautiously. It would help to know whether he is offering a definition of pleasure or whether he is merely saying that something is an example of pleasure: We may say "Swimming is fun" while at the same time agreeing that swimming is also a means of propelling ourselves through the water in an enjoyable manner. It would be strange, however, if we were inclined to *define* swimming as fun, or even as some kind of fun. But in parts of the *Philebus* Plato might be supposed to have lapsed into saying things like "Swimming is fun" rather than "Swimming is an example of fun." In 42d, it has been claimed, it is the restoration (κατάστασις) of a natural state which is said to be not pleasant but pleasure. If Socrates had said that this restoration is pleasant—or, as in the *Timaeus* (64d) that the experience of returning to a natural condition, is pleasant—we should not have worried. That would have been like saying "Swimming is pleasurable" rather than "Swimming is fun." But the Greek is ambiguous: could Socrates mean "restoration is *a* pleasure, i.e., an example of a pleasure"? Probably so, for he recognizes pleasures that are not restorations at 51d-e.⁵ But we should notice that to say that restoration is an example of pleasure is not merely to say that it is pleasant. For "restoration is a pleasure" could mean either "Restoration is identical with a pleasure," or "Restoration is accompanied by a pleasure."

Presumably the *Philebus* was written in the late 350's. The next stage (or possibly another version of the same stage) in the history appears to be represented by our version of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 1. It is impossible to be certain whether Aristotle is speaking here in his own person, but at least he takes it as a working hypothesis that pleasure is—and this time it does look like a serious definition—a movement of the soul and at the same time "a simultaneous and perceptible restoration to the underlying (or basic) natural state" (κατάστασιν ἄνθρωπον καὶ αἰσθητὴν εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν

⁴At *Phlb.* 53c 4–7 it is suggested that the identification of pleasure as a γένεσις is a theory of the κομψοί to which, by implication, Socrates is not committed. Thus it looks as though the path may be open for the suggestion that only one type of pleasure is a γένεσις; but whether the path is intended to be open or not, Plato does not go along it.

Perhaps there is some further indication that in the *Philebus* Plato is not wholly committed to the view of the κομψοί in that when earlier, in the *Republic*, the identification of pleasure and pain with "some kind of motion" comes up (583c 9) Socrates proposes it unambiguously as his own view.

⁵Cf. *Resp.* 584b.

φύσιν, 1369 b 33–35).⁶ That this formula has certain similarities with the language of the *Philebus* (as well as the *Republic* and the *Timaeus*) has not been missed. Pleasure is described as some kind of movement, but the class of pleasures which are not restorations has disappeared. The movement (κίνησις) is clearly in the soul,⁷ while the “restoration” (κατάστασις) is said to be simultaneous and perceptible. We need not spend time on “perceptible,” except that we must assume that the word should not be pressed to refer only to sense-perception. Aristotle can hardly have denied that there are many pleasures which are not recognized by the particular senses, i.e., not recognizable as sensations. (What would he say about mental pleasures?) But pleasure (apparently *all* pleasure) is now a movement of the soul and at the same time a restoration of the natural state. How is this to be understood? If it is a movement of the soul, it must accompany the restoration of the natural state; yet if it is *defined* as a restoration of the natural state, it cannot be a movement of the soul, at least in the Platonic understanding of soul. (Of course, if the soul is the form of the body, then the double description—both movement and restoration—becomes possible.) But in fact the explanation is probably simpler: “Pleasure is the restoration of the natural state” may be the same kind of proposition as the travel agent’s “Happiness is Europe ’72.”

Aristotle’s account of pleasure in the *Rhetoric* is not identical with Plato’s in the *Philebus*; indeed the notion that *all* pleasures are restorations looks like a sloppy oversimplification. But in many respects it is not substantially different. Above all, all pleasure is apparently still some kind of process or at the least associated with a process. If at this time Aristotle had developed any more sophisticated account of pleasure, or any further refining among different varieties of pleasure, we are not aware of it. The use of the term ἀθρόαν does not seem to look forward to future developments, at least not to the abandoning of the notion that pleasure is a process, and the advocacy of an alternative view that it may be complete in the instant; the function of ἀθρόαν seems to be to indicate that the restoration of the bodily organs is significant enough to be noticed. There may be an echo of *Timaeus* 64d. The translation “intense” is too strong;⁸ I should prefer something like “significantly perceptible” or “noticeable.” But there is no suggestion that the process-theory has been dropped.⁹

⁶For ὑπάρχω see G. Lieberg, *Die Lehre von der Lust in den Ethiken des Aristoteles* (Zetemata 19, Munich 1958) 29–30.

⁷Though this is already the case in *Resp.* 583c 9.

⁸So Hardie, *Aristotle’s Ethical Theory* (Oxford 1968) 302.

⁹It seems to be one of the few probably certain beliefs of Aristippus (the Socratic), as Mannebach says, that pleasure is a motion (*Aristippi et Cyrenaicorum Fragmenta*, ed. E. Mannebach [Leiden 1961]). See D. L. 2.85 = Mannebach 193, with note on p. 95,

The next item in our account is represented by Book 7 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*¹⁰—but chronologically this may be nearly contemporary with our version of *Rhetoric* 1. At 1152 b 13 Aristotle mentions a theory that all pleasure is a perceptible (*αἰσθητή*) process to a natural state (*γένεσις ἐστὶν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή*), the theory that he had at least used as a working hypothesis in the *Rhetoric*.¹¹ But he now argues against the theory, though without mentioning the names of its supporters. What objections does he adduce? The crucial sentence at 1152 b 33 ff. (*κατὰ συμβεβηκός αἱ καθιστᾶσαι εἰς τὴν φυσικὴν ἕξιν ἡδεῖαι εἰσιν*) seems to mean that the process of restoration to a natural state is only accidentally pleasant.¹² Thus pleasure cannot now be *defined* as a restoration. And Aristotle goes further. The “activity” that is going on when we desire such restoration is the activity of an unimpaired part of our bodily structure.¹³ Thus we feel pleasure not in the parts being “restored,” but at the restoration in the parts that are already in a natural condition. The proof that Aristotle offers for this last point is that some pleasures (e.g., that of contemplation) do not involve pain or desire; he seems to think that this implies that since pleasure must be physiologically explainable similarly in all its manifestations, if some pleasures are necessarily only felt in those parts of the body that are devoid of pain, desire, and deficiency, therefore all pleasures must be felt in such parts. (This of course implies that the nature of pleasure can be best determined not from the “bodily” pleasures of restoration, but from the painless pleasures of the mind.) In

τέλος δ' ἀπέφαινε τὴν λείαν κίνησιν εἰς αἴσθησιν ἀναδιδομένην. Mannebach's view is endorsed by Guthrie, *HGP* 3 (Cambridge 1969) 494. I suspect that Cyrenaic talk of pleasure *κατὰ κίνησιν* (as Mannebach 195 = Ath. 12.546e) is of later date (i.e., of the younger Aristippus or other Cyrenaics). This would follow if, as I argue below, the *κατὰ κίνησιν* language derives from Aristotle.

¹⁰I shall refer to this book as Book 7 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, though it is also generally treated as Book 6 of the *Eudemean Ethics*. I shall only touch on the general question of the relation between *Eth. Eud.* and *Eth. Nic.* where it concerns the discussion of pleasure. A recent (and sane) account of the problem and its history is given by C. G. Rowe, “The Eudemean and Nicomachean Ethics: A study in the development of Aristotle's thought,” *PCPhS*, Supplement 3 (Cambridge 1971). I shall refer to Book 7's discussion of pleasure as (A) and Book 10's as (B), following Festugière.

¹¹Notice that the theory in the *Philebus* and in (A) identifies pleasure as a *γένεσις*, not a *κίνησις*. In his *Republic* (583e 10) Plato suggested that it is a *κίνησις*. *Κίνησις* recurs in the same sense in the *Rhetoric* (1369 b 33), in (B) (1174 a 19), and, as we shall see, with the Stoics.

¹²We should notice that the word *κατάστασις* (used in the *Philebus* and *Rhetoric*) does not occur in (A); *ἐν κινήσει* and *γένεσις* do. And, as we shall see, it is *ἐν κινήσει*, not a form of *κατάστασις*, that passes over to Epicurus. Of course the *verbal* cognate of *κατάστασις* is found at 1152b 34. Curiously enough, *κατάστασις* (and *ἀποκατάστασις*) recur in the *Magna Moralia* (1205 a 4, 1205 b 6, 1205 b 12.)

¹³This is noticed by G. E. L. Owen in his helpful “Aristotelian Pleasures,” *Proc. Arist. Soc.* (1972) 144.

the process of restoration, therefore, pleasure will arise accidentally (and presumably simultaneously, as in the *Rhetoric*). Notice, however, that pleasure itself is not an “accident,” though it arises “accidentally.” The processes of restoration may happen to produce pleasure, but they are no guide to what the *nature* of pleasure is. (It may be an accident of this table to be in my room, but being in my room tells me nothing about the nature of the table.) Aristotle then goes on to show how what is “naturally pleasant” (φύσει ἡδύ) or “absolutely pleasant” can be distinguished from what is “accidentally pleasant.” Things accidentally pleasant only seem pleasant when some deficiency from a healthy or normal condition is being experienced.

Aristotle next turns to the nature of pleasure itself. It is not a process, nor does it necessarily occur in connection with a process. Rather it is an end and an activity. Here Aristotle is using his own technical distinction between a process and an activity, a distinction in accordance with which he distinguishes an activity as “complete” in the instant, even if also extended over a considerable length of time. Thus if “I see” entails (or is compatible with) “I have seen,” seeing is an activity, not a process.¹⁴ In this sense pleasure too is an activity and complete in itself. Hence the definition (proposed in the *Rhetoric*) of pleasure as a conscious process has to be rejected. Rather pleasure is an unimpeded activity of the natural state, that is, of those parts of the organism which are in their natural condition.

The most important and most misunderstood section of the narrative of (A) begins at 1153 b 7. The first argument runs as follows: just as some kind of knowledge may be the best thing (τἀριστον) even if some forms of knowledge are bad, so the fact that some pleasures are bad in no way lessens the possibility that some pleasure may be the best thing. Aristotle then goes on to argue that since some kind of unimpeded activity (which is pleasure) is the thing most to be desired, so some kind of pleasure (i.e., unimpeded activity) will be the thing most to be desired. Yet this argument does not show that pleasure is to be defined as the supreme good, but that some unimpeded activity, which is pleasure, but not only pleasure (for there must also be the activity of the faculty *qua* faculty, unless we have faculties which do nothing else than generate pleasure) is the best thing (or supreme good, if you will). But even if the argument only shows that much, does Aristotle understand it to show more?¹⁵ Clearly not, for the purpose of the argument is indicated at 1153 b 25 ff.

¹⁴Cf. J. L. Ackrill, “Aristotle’s Distinction Between *ENERGEIA* and *KINESIS*,” *New Essays On Plato and Aristotle*, ed. R. Bambrough (London 1965) 121–141.

¹⁵As (e.g.) P. Merlan observes (*Studies in Epicurus and Aristotle* [Wiesbaden 1960] 28). Aspasius was the first to suggest that an identification of pleasure and the good might indicate that (A) is the work of Eudoxus (*CAG* 19¹, p. 151, 24 ff. Heylbut).

Here the fact that all beasts and men pursue pleasure is held to be an indication that *in some sense* (πως) pleasure is the best thing.¹⁶ The "in some sense" cannot be neglected; and it fits our interpretation of the previous section. "The best thing is in some sense pleasure," seems to mean that the best thing is pleasurable, or even, the most pleasurable, not that the best thing is to be simply identified with pleasure.

What we have then is not an identification of pleasure as the supreme good, but a statement about the principal object of desire which is a pleasure. But, an objection might run, all beasts and men pursue pleasure, but it is not the same pleasure which they all pursue. Aristotle, however, will not have this—and his comments on it have rightly been seen as a particularly striking feature of the discussion in (A). Perhaps, he explains, it is really the same pleasure that is pursued, even if the pursuers do not recognize the fact. But why should this be so? Because beasts and men share something divine by nature, and—Aristotle apparently wishes to say—this fact is indicated in the universal search for a pleasure, which must therefore be an identical pleasure.

For our own purposes there are a few specific points in the later part of (A) to which we must draw particular attention: the notion that a man can be happy on the wheel is rejected at 1153 b 19; and it is argued at 1154 b 6 ff., that there are people so constituted that for them there is no neutral state between pleasure and pain. Hence both absence of pleasure and positive pain are to them painful. Thus pain would appear to be definable as an absence of pleasure. Finally the whole discussion of pleasure in (A) ends with a theory that, since our nature is not "simple," we cannot enjoy a single permanent pleasure as God can. Our pleasures, because of some weakness (πονηρίαν τινά), come and go. Hence we cannot enjoy that pleasure in rest (ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ) which God enjoys; we need also pleasure in movement (ἐν κινήσει). Both pleasures are, of course, still activities in the Aristotelian sense, for there is an activity of movement as well as an activity of immobility.¹⁷

From this brief account of some of the relevant parts of (A) let us now extract a series of propositions:

1. Pleasure is not a process (γένεσις) but may be an accompaniment of a process occurring in those organs or parts of organs which do not need "restoration."
2. Pleasure is an activity and an end.
3. There are two kinds of pleasure, pleasure in movement (κίνησις) and pleasure in immobility. Both are (as 2 above) activities.

¹⁶The point was made in general by A. Barbieri, "Aristotele e l'edonismo di Eudosso," *GCFI* 33 (1954) 525.

¹⁷Cf. *Eth. Eud.* 1249 a 20 (οὐ γίνεται δὲ ἡδονὴ μὴ ἐν πράξει).

4. Pleasure is therefore complete in the instant, though it may of course have longer duration.
5. Pleasure is an *unimpeded* natural activity.
6. In some sense (left unclear) pleasure is “the best thing.”
7. All men and animals probably pursue the same pleasure (even though often unwittingly).

To these we may add two more peripheral points:

8. It is nonsense to say that a good man is happy on the wheel.
9. For some people at least, absence of pleasure is pain, i.e., there is no intermediate state between pleasure and pain. But the sensible man pursues absence of the pain (*ἀλυπία*) that arises from the desire for restorative pleasures (1153 a 31).¹⁸

The next material we should consider is not the tenth book of the *Ethics*, (B), but the philosophical writings of Epicurus. We may notice the following points in particular:

1. Pleasure is never identified as a restoration (*κατάστασις*) or as a process (*γένεσις*); but some pleasure (the highest) is *τὸ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα*.¹⁹
2. There are two kinds of pleasures, those which are *katastematic* (D.L. 10.136),²⁰ and those which are *κατὰ κίνησιν* or *ἐν κινήσει*. This appears to be the Aristotelian distinction. Even the phrase *ἐν κινήσει* occurs in (A) (1154 b 28); the word *κινητική* is not used by Epicurus.²¹
3. All “kinetic” pleasures vary *katastematic* pleasures in the same organs.²²
4. *χαρά* and *εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργεία βλέπονται*, i.e., even kinetic pleasures are activities (D.L. 10.136).
5. Pleasure is complete in the instant.²³
6. Pleasure is the end of life.
7. All creatures pursue “basic” pleasure, i.e., the same pleasure (which is in fact absence of pain).
8. The wise man is happy on the rack (D.L. 10.118).
9. The highest pleasure is absence of pain: there is no intermediate state between pleasure and pain.

¹⁸ *Ἀλυπία* in general becomes the goal of the later Peripatetic Hieronymus of Rhodes (F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles*, frs. 8–18).

¹⁹ Plut. *Non posse*, 1089d (Us. 68).

²⁰ Cf. Olympiodorus in *Phil.*, p. 274 Stallbaum = Us. 416.

²¹ Cf. J. M. Rist, *Epicurus* (Cambridge 1972) 102.

²² Cf. most recently, J. M. Rist (above, note 21) 108–111, 170–172.

²³ Epicurus, *VS* 42 (and *KD* 19); cf. C. Diano, “La psicologia d’Epicuro e la teoria delle passioni,” *GCFT* 21 (1940) 159.

What I need to indicate is that these nine features of Epicureanism all find an analogue or point of comparison in (A). Certainly Aristotle and Epicurus do not agree on every detail, though there are striking points of coincidence, such as the ideas that *all* pleasure is activity and that there are two specific kinds of pleasure. Aristotle mentions a view that absence of pleasure is pain; Epicurus holds that absence of pain is pleasure.²⁴ Both indicate that the problem of a possible intermediate state is not dead. Epicurus talks about whether the wise man is happy on the rack, Aristotle thinks of the wheel. Again the problem is the same. Our next objective should be to consider how many of these specific Epicurean points in (A) occur in the tenth book of the *Ethics* (B).

First comes the notion of pleasure as an activity, accepted in (A); it is not mentioned in (B). A different formulation is offered. Pleasure is certainly still not a process (κίνησιν καὶ γένεσιν, 1173 a 31 ff.); it is indeed something “in accordance with which” we are active (ἐνεργεῖν, 1173 b 3). It is complete in the instant (1174 b 5–6) but accompanies the activities of various bodily or mental organs. However it is described as completing the activity of the organ, but not *qua* the actual functioning of that organ. Rather it is a supervening end, like the bloom of health on those in the prime of life (ἐπιγιγνόμενόν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα)—and the same attitude seems to be found in Book 2.²⁵ And the reason we do not continue feeling pleasure indefinitely is also explained somewhat differently than in account (A). In (B) the somewhat simplistic remark that we are not simple is given more body. Pleasure depends on the state of each organ, and tiredness will lead to a decline in pleasure, just as it leads to a decline in the successful use of the organ itself (1175 a 4–10).

In brief, although (A), (B),²⁶ and Epicurus agree that pleasure is not a process and that it is therefore complete in the instant, in several respects where (A) and Epicurus come together, (B) remains apart. For Epicurus and (A) pleasure is the end, or an end. (B) qualifies this: pleasure is specifically a supervenient end. And if (A) and (B) are nearer than they look, the wording of (A) is much nearer to that of Epicurus. Above all, where (A) emphasises the divine in the search for pleasure and brackets men with animals,²⁷ thus pointing to Epicurus, (B) emphasises the ques-

²⁴As we shall see, the *Magna Moralia* comments that a life free from pain is “near” to pleasure (1204 a 24).

²⁵Cf. *Eth. Nic.* 2, 1104 b 4–6, Σημίον δὲ δεῖ ποιέσθαι τῶν ἔξω τὴν ἐπιγιγνομένην ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην τοῖς ἔργοις and 1104 b 34, κοινὴ τε γὰρ αὕτη τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν παρακολουθεῖ. We should notice that the nearest passage in the parallel section of *Eth. Eud.* does not contain forms of ἐπιγίγνεσθαι or παρακολουθεῖν (*Eth. Eud.* 1220 b 13–14, οἷς ἔπεται . . . ἡ αἰσθητικὴ ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη καθ’ αὐτά; cf. *Eth. Nic.* 10, 1175 a 6).

²⁶On the relation between (A) and (B) see now Owen (above, note 13).

²⁷Cf. Merlan (above, note 15) 20, 22.

tion of intellect and separates men from animals, thus pointing to the Stoics.

There is one more quasi-Aristotelian document to which we should briefly turn: the *Magna Moralia*. I do not intend to go into the question of authorship, but merely to express an opinion against the view that this is an Aristotelian document.²⁸ But clearly it is at least heavily indebted to Aristotle, and it may be helpful to us to see on which of the Aristotelian discussions of pleasure it chiefly relies. Fortunately the answer is clear; it is discussion (A). It is true that the most significant of all the special proposals of (A) is omitted: the proposal that the fact that men and animals perhaps pursue a single pleasure is to be explained by their common possession of “something divine.” But this must be set against a variety of other considerations. Pleasure in the *Magna Moralia* is not a process, not a restoration (the formulation of this at 1205 b 7, with the phrase *τὴν αὐτοῦ*, looks back to the *Philebus*, 42d 5); there are pleasures of restoration and pleasures of the restored state, but both are activities (1205 b 21). There is indeed an argument about the claim (but perhaps of the *Rhetoric* [1362 b 5]) that all things desire pleasure; but the suggestion is rejected that it is nevertheless the same pleasure (1204 a 38 ff., 1205 b 9 ff.). And we have already noticed how for the author of the *Magna Moralia* absence of pain is near to pleasure.²⁹ The only phraseology which seems to suggest (B) (and *Eth. Nic.* 2) rather than (A) is *ἡ γὰρ λύπη ἐπὶ τοῖς δι’ ἀνάγκην ἐστὶν* (1206 a 15); the *ἐπὶ* perhaps reminds us of the *ἐπιγινόμενον τι τέλος* of 1174 b 36. But further details are unnecessary. No one can (or does) deny that the *Magna Moralia* is closer to (A) than to (B).

Let us now look at the writing of the older Stoics. Pleasure is not their most frequent subject of discussion, but a few passages are informative. The Stoics, or some of them, distinguish *ἡδοναί* (pleasures of a “perverted” reason) from *χαράι* (emotional states associated with a healthy reason), but for our present investigations this is unimportant: what matters is that both *ἡδοναί* and *χαράι* are by-products (*ἐπιγεννήματα*). That this looks something like Aristotle’s account in (B)—or Book 2 of the *Ethics*—has been noticed,³⁰ but the question has not been considered closely enough. For the Stoics there is no indication that pleasure is a *τέλος*, so

²⁸For some effective comments on Dirlmeier’s more recent idea that the *Magna Moralia* is authentic see D. J. Allan, *JHS* 77 (1957) 7–11, and his review of Dirlmeier’s *Eudemische Ethik* (*Gnomon* 38 [1966] 142–144).

²⁹Does this echo (A), 1153 a 31, or is there an influence of the later Peripatetic Hieronymus, or of Epicurus himself?

³⁰D. L. 7.86 (= *SVF* 3.178) for *ἡδονή*; 7.94 (= *SVF* 3.76) for *χαρά* and *εὐφροσύνη*. Cf. Haynes (above, note 2) 414; Long (above, note 2) 80; Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* (Cambridge 1969) 46. For *ἐπιγεννήματα* see especially *Stoic Philosophy* 48, note 5 (with Marcus Aurelius 6.36).

that here at least Aristotle is at best silently corrected. More interesting, however, is the question of whether pleasure is "natural." Aristotle's account (A), of course, assumes that it is, as does Epicurus. But the Stoics, when they make their distinction between the pleasures of a healthy and a perverted "reason" are in doubt. 'Ἡδονή is a *pathos*, and a *pathos* is "an irrational and unnatural *movement* of the soul" (D.L. 7.110).³¹ The definition as a movement seems to suggest a neglect of the long tradition of analysis of the relation between pleasure and movement from the *Philebus* on—or a totally different approach which does without a body-soul dichotomy.³² The Stoics may have gone back to Plato's *Laws*,³³ but handled him in a novel manner.

But in one important respect the Stoics did not go back to Plato; they were liable to call pleasure (or at least ἡδονή) unnatural: "an irrational and unnatural movement of the soul," reports Diogenes.³⁴ We must try to inspect the theories of the earliest Stoic leaders in more detail: for Zeno, we have no useful evidence, but Cleanthes seems to have thought that even apparently innocuous (and perhaps unavoidable) pleasures are non-natural (μήτε κατὰ φύσιν). Cleanthes holds the "Aristotelian" view of pleasure as an ἐπιγέννημα, but his explanation of it is that pleasure is thus like a cosmetic.³⁵ We notice that he does not claim that it is unnatural (παρὰ φύσιν): his view that it is non-natural is presumably a gloss on its being a by-product. We notice that the Stoics apparently used the word ἡδονή in different senses: sometimes, as we have seen, it is opposed to χαρά as "irrational" pleasure; at other times it is a general term referring either to "rational" or to "irrational" pleasure. It must be this latter sense which is employed by Cleanthes. Doubtless he thinks some pleasures are vicious—and hence unnatural. The rest are non-natural. Is there then no "natural" pleasure? The evidence we have would suggest not. Perhaps no "by-product" is natural; and χαρά is a "by-product," as we have seen. Pleasures are either unnatural and associated with an unhealthy "reason," or non-natural and associated with a sound "reason." This curious approach is corrected by Archedemus who proposed that all pleasure is natural (κατὰ φύσιν), and by Panaetius who took the obvious way out and said that some pleasure is natural (κατὰ φύσιν), the rest unnatural (παρὰ φύσιν).³⁶ We need not spend time, however, on

³¹Cf. D. L. 7.114 (= SVF 3.400).

³²Cf. Rist (above, note 30) 22–36.

³³*Laws* 897a makes pleasure and pain movements of the soul.

³⁴The Stoic description of pleasure as a κίνησις, rather than a γένεσις, reminds us of Aristotle's account (B) rather than (A) (see note 11 above), though again we may be going right back to Plato. But if to Plato, then to the *Republic* (583e 10), not the *Philebus*.

³⁵Sext. Emp. *Math.* 11.73 = SVF 3.155.

³⁶*Ibid.*

the internal Stoic arguments; on one point all the Stoics agree: pleasure is at best a by-product, a cosmetic for Cleanthes, like hair under the armpits for Archedemus. More important is the phrase *τελικὸν ἀγαθόν*, applied to *χαρά* by Stobaeus. We do not know whose phrase it was. Again, perhaps, it may be an echo of Aristotle, though a distant one.³⁷ But again, certainly not an echo of (A).

Let us try to pull a few threads together. Discussion on pleasure flares up again in the late 350's, and Plato's *Philebus* is a witness. Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and (A) indicate further (and possibly contemporaneous) fragments of this discussion,³⁸ and this is the context into which the work of Epicurus fits. Oddly enough, the *Magna Moralia* too has similarities with this set of writings, though this probably only means that (A) is its primary source for the discussion of pleasure. On the other hand (B) marks a different phase—a phase of which the Stoic comments on pleasure seem to be a distant echo. Where the Stoics go back behind (B) they seem perhaps to be looking at the original themes of Plato's *Philebus*, or *Laws*, or even *Republic*, rather than to other Aristotelian discussion. While Epicurus represents part of the argument which began in the 350's, the Stoic writings seem to be of an age where the issue is no longer live.

Is it possible to put dates to the Epicurean and Stoic discussions? Epicurus arrived in Athens in 323 at the age of 18. Although not without previous exposure to philosophy, he probably first met the ideas of Aristotle, however briefly, at this time. Demetrius of Magnesia, however, only tells us that he listened to the Platonist Xenocrates (D.L. 10.13). But in any case Aristotle died in the next year, 322, so that both (A) and (B) must have existed at the time of Epicurus' visit, if they are Aristotelian at all. But of course we do not know in what form they existed.

Düring has proposed a relative chronology of Aristotle's works which makes a good deal of sense.³⁹ He puts an *original* version of *Rhetoric* 1 and 2 between 360 and 355, and the *Eudemean Ethics*, together with the *Philebus*, between 355 and Plato's death in 347. That means that if (A) was originally part of the *Eudemean Ethics*, or derived from an account in the *Eudemean Ethics*, it must, along with the *Philebus*, be a contribution to the ongoing debate about pleasure. Düring dates the *Nicomachean Ethics* (and therefore certainly account [B]) to the period after Plato's

³⁷Stob. *Ecl.* 2, p. 71, 15 = *SF* 3.106. Aristotle certainly thought that some "goods" are associated with means and some with ends.

³⁸Scholars have often noticed that while (B) mentions Eudoxus by name as the upholder of a theory from which Aristotle dissociates himself, (A) does not mention him—and some have assumed this to mean that (A) is more or less straight Eudoxus. We can certainly agree that in (A) Aristotle is more powerfully influenced by Eudoxus, and that this is one of the pointers to its earlier date (in some form, though not necessarily ours).

³⁹*Aristoteles* (Heidelberg 1966) 48–52.

death and after Aristotle's return to Athens, that is, between 334 and 322. Yet, although some version of the *Nicomachean Ethics* must have existed by the time Epicurus first reached Athens, he knows only the ideas about pleasure represented by the earlier version (A). Indeed, if there were two versions of (A) in circulation, one originally designed for the *Eudemean Ethics*, and one revised for the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Epicurus must have been familiar only with the earlier version—or he would have known (B) as well! What this suggests is a theory that the *text* of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (or at least of Book 10) was not widely available (even among those interested in philosophy, and in pleasure in particular) until after Aristotle's death. We can easily understand that Epicurus might not have *heard* Aristotle talking the language of (B); it is harder to assume he would not have read it, if it was in the public domain.

We may speculate further. Certainly Epicurus returned to Athens in 306, by which time the *Nicomachean Ethics* was presumably more widely known. Why did Epicurus not make use of it? Perhaps by the time he had set himself up in Athens as a teacher, he had no interest in learning; he already had a philosophy! But do we need to follow this unflattering line, characteristic of Epicurus though it is? Do we know that the *Nicomachean Ethics* was available in Athens even in 306? Not for certain. We do know, as we have argued, that certain Stoics are aware of some of the ideas to be found there, though the debate about pleasure had long since subsided and no longer occupied the centre of the philosophical stage. But we do not know whether Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, is responsible for the Stoic use of the ideas of *Nicomachean Ethics* 10 (and 2?). For Cleanthes, as we have seen, the concept of pleasure as an *ἐπιγέννημα* is certain, but Cleanthes is a mid-third century figure.⁴⁰ Even though he probably made few startlingly new approaches in ethics, we cannot *assume* that his account of pleasure exactly corresponds with that of Zeno. So it still remains possible that even in 306 the *Nicomachean Ethics* was not in wide circulation. And in general it must be admitted that although Stoic ethics frequently builds on foundations prepared by Aristotle, we cannot pin down any of the relevant texts to Zeno rather than to later Stoics. We must remain agnostic, therefore, as to when the influence of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (and therefore, of [B]) penetrated to the Stoic school—and whether Epicurus could have read it by 306.

There is a feature of the comparison between Stoic and Epicurean reaction to Aristotle's doctrine of pleasure to which we must return. Epicurus, like Eudoxus, and perhaps even the Aristotle of (A), makes pleasure the highest good: Epicurus is joining in an as yet unresolved debate at the time when Aristotle at least had passed it by. By the time

⁴⁰Cf. H. von Arnim, "Kleanthes," *RE* 11¹. 558–574.

the Stoics come across Aristotle's writings, the struggle is over; hence perhaps the more casual and vaguer Stoic references to (B) when compared with the more specific and close attention Epicurus pays to (A).

An anxiety remains. If Epicurus was so interested in (A), why did he not take more interest, even in 323, in what Aristotle was doing, for Aristotle must at least have been talking about (B)? Or did he not learn anything at all about pleasure in 323? But if not, then when did he come across (A) while failing to hear of (B)? But do we have to believe that Aristotle was totally obscure in 323 and that Epicurus knew little of him? Some might like to follow this road, but at the least it must be admitted that Aristotle had been a prominent member of the Academy. Later on, as we know, Epicurus despised Aristotle.⁴¹ Did he then come late in life, when his own views were largely developed, to pay so much attention to (A), the fairly early work of a man whom he despised? Or is the solution after all that what we find in (A) is basically Eudoxus (and known to be so by Epicurus), only transcribed by Aristotle with a minimum of change? Did Epicurus pick up his theory of pleasure from the famous astronomer rather than the obscure polymath? It might look that way. But there is a serious, indeed probably fatal, objection: the author of the end of (A) wields Aristotle's own account of *κίνησις* and *ἐνέργεια*—and Epicurus knows that distinction. There is a *prima facie* case that Epicurus met (A) in 323, in written form, and that he knew it to be Aristotelian. The corollary, as we have suggested, is that (B) did not exist in written form in 323.⁴²

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⁴¹Cf. Usener 171, and I. Düring, *Aristotle in the Biographical Tradition* (Göteborg 1957) 385–386.

⁴²At various stages this paper has been read by Professor T. M. Robinson, Dr A. A. Long, and Professor F. H. Sandbach, and I should like to thank them for their constructive criticism.